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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 71 SUMMER 1997 NUMBER 3
CHRISTIANITY AND THE CIVIL LAW:
SECULARITY, PRIVACY, AND THE STATUS
OF OBJECTIVE MORAL NORMS
WILLIAM JOSEPH WAGNER*
If asked what concrete issue comes to mind when the topic of
"Christianity and the Civil Law" is mentioned, the average
American today, who is also a practicing Catholic, would proba-
bly answer "abortion." The abortion controversy has been the oc-
casion for one of the most intensive efforts ever made by Ameri-
can Catholics to influence the shape of civil law.' Catholic efforts
have not generally led to an amendment of the laws, but have of-
ten led merely to a renewal of intellectual prejudice against
Catholics.2 The association of the Catholic stance on the rela-
" Associate Professor of Law, Columbus School of Law, The Catholic University
of America, B.A., University of California at Los Angeles, J.D., Yale University,
M.A., The Catholic University of America.
' The efforts of Catholics in the United States to influence abortion law in the
recent past are not without precedent. Catholics have sought to influence lawmak-
ing on a wide range of welfare-related issues out of moral conviction since, at least,
the founding of the National Catholic Welfare Council in September 24, 1919, and
the issuance in the same year of The Bishops' Program of Social Reconstruction. See
10 NEW CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA, National Catholic Welfare Conference (NCWC)
225 (2d ed. 1967); see also TIMOTHY A. BYRNES & MARY C. SEGERS, THE CATHOLIC
CHURCH AND THE POLITICS OF ABORTION (1992) (discussing Catholic Church's recent
attempts to influence public policy on abortion); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION:
THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES (1990) (reviewing history of abortion and abortion rights
in America).
2 A federal suit of the 1980's which sought the removal of the Catholic Church's
tax exempt status because of its efforts to influence national abortion policy ap-
peared to some to be symbolic of resurgent anti-Catholic prejudice. See In re United
States Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1989) (action dismissed for lack
of standing); see also Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., Hostility to Religion, American
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tionship of civil law and religion with the abortion issue is pain-
ful for many Catholics.3
The devout Catholic tends to hold that there is an objective
basis for rejecting abortion, which lawmakers should be amena-
ble to understanding no less than arguments in favor of prohibit-
ing theft or fostering public education.4 But, the Catholic may
also experience doubt about his or her position, since it is so
widely repudiated by the press and an influential sector of public
opinion.5
When the Catholic Christian tries to apply objective moral
norms to proposals for legal reform in this area, he or she fre-
quently is ruled out of order on one of two grounds. The first
ground used to invalidate Catholic arguments is that the civil
law is "secular" and, thus, in principle, closed to arguments
Style, 42A DEPAUL L. REV. 263, 279-93 (1992) (placing this present day hostility
within context of historical prejudice against Catholics). In the longer term, greater
harm might flow to the credibility of Catholicism's intellectual integrity if it were to
capitulate to the widespread contemporary societal denial of the demonstrably
homicidal character of abortion.
3 The pain has been palpable as the Catholic Bishops have wrestled to find a
way to preserve their Catholic stance on abortion while avoiding alienating their
general American audience. The Bishops' interim solution has been to offer a med-
ley of policy commitments in the form of a "consistent ethic of life," linking "church
opposition to abortion with activism against nuclear arms, poverty and capital pun-
ishment," on the ground that doing so was "essential if the Church's message is to
be seen as a coherent, credible agenda in support of human life." Bruce Buursma,
Bishops Adopt Bernadin Plan for 'Pro-Life' Activism, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 15, 1985, at
C21. Joseph Cardinal Bernadin's "seamless garment" metaphor notes that opposi-
tion to abortion, the death penalty, the nuclear arms race, and the exploitation of
the poor are all pro-life policies and part of a broader "approach to the sacredness of
life." GARRY WILLS, UNDER GOD: RELIGION AND AMERICAN POLITICS 324 (1990).
United States Representative Henry Hyde has called the seamless garment meta-
phor "an unwarranted moral equivalence." Tom Roberts, Catholic Right Hears Plea
for Tolerance, NAT'L CATH. REP., Dec. 8, 1995, at 14.
' See Jeremy Waldron, Religious Contributions in Public Deliberation, 30 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 817, 824 (1993) (classifying theologically-based regulations according
to their level of application: 1) only members of a specific congregation; 2) a given
class of persons (i.e., Catholics); 3) universal (all men and women)). It is the last
category which has an objective basis. Id.
r It has been observed that news reporters often specify "the religious affilia-
tions of abortion opponents who are Catholic while leaving unspecified the affilia-
tions of others." BYRNES & SEGERS, supra note 1, at 153; see also Terry Golway, Life
in the 90's, AMERICA, May 25, 1996, at 7 (demonstrating association made by politi-
cians and press between Catholics and abortion issues); Edd Doer, Curbing Popula-
tion: An Opportunity Missed, USA TODAY MAG., Jan. 1, 1995, at 36-37 (suggesting
President Reagan "brought U.S. policy into line with Vatican wishes," by halting
United Nations efforts at population control).
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based in religion;6 the "objective moral norms" of the Catholic
being characterized as "religious."7 The second ground raised to
quash Catholic arguments is that the areas of conduct implicated
in abortion are "private" and beyond the regulative scope of the
civil law.8
The trauma of the abortion controversy for the Catholic is
only partly that he or she is powerless to change the law. The
trauma also lies in the Catholic position being treated, in effect,
as having no meaning worthy of public recognition.9 The latter
event is what accounts for many Catholics desisting from further
defense of the Catholic position, even while they are unable to
affirm a status quo which they find morally disturbing."°
The intellectual danger of the abortion controversy is that it
will lead Catholics not only to abandon a practical commitment
to the present concrete moral challenges of lawmaking and citi-
zenship, but to abandon as well their own distinctive modes of
reasoning about law and morality." The latter kind of aban-
' The "secular" argument is not new. See George McKenna, On Abortion: A Lin-
colnian Position, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Sept. 1, 1995, at 51. Mr. McKenna notes
the historical analogue between modem assertions that moral arguments are too
"religious" to be inserted into the secular abortion debate with similar issues arising
during the debate on slavery. Id. at 58.
7 A principle such as Bruce Ackerman's requirement of neutral dialogue might
be applied, for example, for this purpose. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN
THE LIBERAL STATE 331-35 (1980).
8 The right of privacy as embodied in contemporary American constitutional law
can, with however little convincing justification, be put to this purpose: "[Tihe right
to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civi-
lized men." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting). Thus, Justice William 0. Douglas reasoned on one occasion as follows:
The right of privacy has no more conspicuous place than in the physician-
patient relationship, unless it be in the priest-penitent relationship ....
[S]tate-imposed control over the medical decision whether pregnancy
should be interrupted ... is a total destruction of the right of privacy be-
tween physician and patient and the intimacy of relation which that en-
tails.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 179, 219 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).9 See Gaffney, supra note 2, at 287; McKenna, supra note 6, at 6.
10 See Gaffney, supra note 2, at 285.
Examples abound of avowedly Christian, or even Catholic, positions on abor-
tion not grounded in a classically Roman Catholic approach to reasoning about law
and morality. See, e.g., Jennifer Bradley, Choice Words, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 27,
1995, at 16-19 (disclosing that Francis Kissling, President of Catholics for a Free
Choice, seeks to provide philosophy mediating between being good liberal and good
Catholic, without any apparent familiarity with the Catholic tradition); Garry Wills,
Evangels of Abortion, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, June 15, 1989, at 15, 18-21 (illustrating
that Randall Terry's anti-abortion activism rests on goals formulated without ap-
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donment would be an irremediable harm. It would entail the
loss of a constitutive element of the Catholic religion. 12 And,
from a purely human standpoint, it would be to relinquish one of
the world's profound traditions of thought on the nature and
meaning of law.
If this danger is to be averted, Catholics must retrieve and
renew their distinctive understanding of the relationship be-
tween civil law and objective morality, and their understanding
of how their view of that relationship forms a constitutive ele-
ment of their religion. In today's context, however, Catholics
cannot be said to understand these matters adequately unless
they have understood and answered, within a Catholic frame-
work, the overriding objections based on "secularity" and
,'privacy.'') 13
The remainder of this article will explore the outlines of an
answer to this intellectual challenge to Catholicism. In doing so,
it will address three specific questions within a Catholic frame-
work: 1) What is the justification for asserting that objective
moral norms apply to the content of the civil law?; 2) Why is not
the law's "secular" character a barrier to enactments, based on
objective moral norms?; and 3) Why is not the "private" character
of reproductive and other activities a barrier to the enactment of
legal regulation affecting them?
In developing answers to these questions, this article will
rely primarily on the writings of St. Augustine and St. Thomas
Aquinas, taking it as noncontroversial that these thinkers are
perennial sources of Catholic thought.14 The points made and
parently being informed by Catholic tradition of thought on law and morality). No-
table contrasts can be found to the examples of Terry and Kissling. See Joseph A.
Califano, Jr., The Dangers of Discovery, AMERICA, Jan. 14, 1995, at 8, 11 (advocating
open discussion of whether advances in medical technology are serving human
needs).
12 In its broad outlines, a characteristic approach to questions of law and moral-
ity has historically been constitutive of Catholicism. This historic connection is
surely based, at some level of generality at least, on theological premises which have
an inherent necessity within a Catholic understanding of fidelity to Divine Revela-
tion. The approach developed here is proposed as being characteristic of Catholic
modes of reasoning, not authoritative magisterial pronouncements.
13 See infra Part II A-B (discussing use of Augustinian-Thomist scheme of
thought to counter these objections); see supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text
(laying out "secular" and "privacy" arguments).
14 See, e.g., THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA (Fathers of the English
Dominican Province trans., Benzinger Brothers, Inc. 1947) [hereinafter SUMMA]
(because there are many translations of SUMMA THEOLOGICA, this article will cite
only to book, chapter, and paragraph); ST. AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD (Henry
[Vol. 71:515
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answers asserted could be supported by additional references to
many other Catholic thinkers and to magisterial documents, but
the scope of the present article does not permit their inclusion.
In order to place the Catholic position into profile, it will help to
contrast it with that of thinkers who have influenced dominant
attitudes on the value and meaning of secularity and privacy.
Within the constraints of this short article, reliance will be
placed on the thought of John Locke and John Rawls to provide
this alternative perspective.15
OBJECTIVE MORALITY AS A BASIS OF NORMATIVE DIRECTION FOR
CIVIL LAW
In seeking to understand what Catholicism says about mo-
rality's relevance to civil law, it makes sense to begin with what
Catholicism considers morality. Generally, morality can be de-
fined as a set of commitments or ideas about how people ought to
act or are obliged to act.16 Differing moralities have in the past,
and do today, have currency. The distinctive morality of Ca-
tholicism has a number of salient features, even leaving room for
the various schools of thought within Catholicism. 7
Because St. Thomas Aquinas is the pre-eminent representa-
Bettenson trans., 1972) [hereinafter CITY OF GOD] (because there are many transla-
tions of THE CITY OF GOD, this article will only cite to book and chapter). David
Tracy offers a useful concept for discerning the meaning of these two thinkers for
Catholic thought on law, with his concept of a "classic" work. DAVID TRACY, THE
ANALOGICAL IMAGINATION 99-135 (1981) (explaining that interpretation of "classic"
involves not only subjective understanding but also "pre-understanding" of text, i.e.,
context in which reader interprets text).
See, e.g., John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, in JOHN LOCKE:
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., 1960) [hereinafter Second Trea-
tise]; JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1972)
[hereinafter THEORY OF JUSTICE].
'6 In claiming that " 'Moral' has no axiomatic or canonical meaning in either
popular or academic-philosophical culture," Michael Perry overstates his case.
MICHAEL J. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS, AND LAW 7 (1988). While interpretations of
the term cannot proceed far without stumbling upon deep-seated pluralism and
even disintegration in contemporary culture, the term would seem to have a rea-
sonably clear ordinary definition.
17 A major historical example is the division between voluntarist and intellec-
tualist approaches and Dominican and Franciscan Schools. See generally THOMAS E.
DAVITT, THE NATURE OF LAW (1951). The voluntarist approach asserts that a per-
son's will is autonomous, free of the person's intellect and the "cause of the freedom
of election." Id. at 2-3. The intellectualist approach asserts that a person's will and
intellect are interactive; the will being dependent on the intellect to make choices.
Id. at 3.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:515
tive of the Catholic tradition of thought about morality,"8 his
ideas provide a sense of what Catholicism generally means by
morality and, in particular, by the "objectivity" of morality." St.
Thomas begins from the premise that the human being's Ulti-
mate End is God.2" Among its other meanings, this concept as-
serts that a person's happiness, fulfillment, and self-realization
ultimately flows from fully and unreservedly knowing and loving
God, who is the proper transcendent, infinite, and entirely good
object of the human person's deepest, most authentic desire."
Reaching this "Ultimate End," however, requires some ap-
parent indirection. For the human being, by contrast to God, is
finite and is constituted within a finite world.22 The way, there-
fore, that the human being reaches his or her fulfillment in God
is, in essential part, by choosing well in relation to the goods of
Creation, which, after all, define the conceivable scope of con-
crete human action.2" Grounded in human freedom, such choices
can be described as "moral" choices.2
According to St. Thomas, choosing well entails conceiving of
and executing action in a way so as to order the desire for, or at-
tachment to, any particular created good to the requirements of
a good or virtuous character.' Such action neither falls short of,
nor overshoots the goal of several basic human purposes of
'8 For a general discussion of St. Thomas Aquinas' approach to the law, see
Thomas E. Davitt, Law as Means to End-Thomas Aquinas, 14 VAND. L. REV. 65
(1960) (noting that Aquinas wrote "the first systematically organized treatise on law
and its philosophical roots.").
19 The meaning of objectivity in this context relates to the universality of the
terms of practical reason. See TIMOTHY E. O'CONNELL, PRINCIPLES FOR A CATHOLIC
MORALITY 124 (1978).
20 SUMMA, supra note 14, at I-I, Q. 3, Art. 8; see also PAUL J. GLENN, A TOUR
OF THE SUMMA 100, 102 (1960).
21 SUMMA, supra note 14, at I-II, Q. 3, Art. 8.
22 Id. at I-I1, Q. 5, Art. 6. The essence of God is greater than the nature of man
can understand. Id. at I-II, Q. 5, Art. 5.
23 Id. at I-II, Q. 5, Art. 7. The will must choose "works of virtue." See GLENN, su-
pra note 20, at 105.
24 SUMMA, supra note 14, at I-II, Q. 6, Art. 1.
21 Id. at I-II, Q. 61, Art. 1; see also THOMAS AQUINAS, THE TREATISE ON LAW 67
(R.J. Henle ed., 1993) [hereinafter TREATISE] (identifying temperance, fortitude,
justice, and prudence as virtues that assist in making good moral choices). "In order
to determine the rightness or wrongness of acts ... we have to determine whether or
not they are reasonable and virtuous." DANIEL MARK NELSON, THE PRIORITY OF
PRUDENCE: VIRTUE AND NATURAL LAW IN THOMAS AQUINAS AND THE IMPLICATIONS
FOR MODERN ETHICS 127 (1992).
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goods.26 Recta Ratio, or "right reason," is the intellect habituated
to virtue; it is capable of identifying these purposes and deter-
mining whether a given action furthers them in due measure.27
If the choice to pursue some created good contravenes a ba-
sic human purpose and harms our character, by undermining the
will's habitual orientation to true human fulfillment, it is a bad
moral choice.28 It disorders our relationship with the goods of
Creation by placing the disproportionate enjoyment of a lower
good over higher available goods and, thus, over the unrestricted
openness to good of a virtuous character. It may even entail the
more fundamental disorder of satisfaction pursued in direct vio-
lation of a basic human purpose." Acts having this latter char-
acter are said by St. Thomas to run "against nature" or
"reason."31
Choosing in a manner that is against basic goods or that
places lower goods over higher ones necessarily offends against
the order of good found in the created universe as a whole, which
means that it is an offense against God.32 Since God is personal,
this offense has the character of an injustice, in that it refuses to
give God His Due.33
For St. Thomas, an especially important species of immoral-
28 SUMMA, supra note 14, at I-II, Q. 60, Art. 4 (stating that "moral virtue con-
sists in a kind of mean, the mean in contrary passions stands in the same ratio to
both, even as in the natural order there is but one mean between two contraries,
e.g., between black and white"). Different passions do not require different moral
virtues because they seek the same thing, "the attainment of some good or the
avoidance of some evil." Id.
27 Id. at I-II, Q. 90, Art. 1.
28 Id. at I-II, Q. 94, Art. 2; see also TREATISE, supra note 25, at 250 (discussing
human inclinations and human goods and stressing St. Thomas' view that human
nature is basically good, but one's act must be ordered according to reason).29 SUMIMA, supra note 14, at I-II, Q. 21, Art. 4; see also SUMMA THEOLOGIAE: A
CONCISE TRANSLATION 200 (Timothy McDermott ed., 1989) [hereinafter CONCISE
TRANSLATION] (explaining that "if you do something that cannot be related to God
as ultimate goal you do him dishonor and deserve redress from him .... [E]verything
a man has or can have is ordered to God and all human actions merit God's reward
or punishment.").
20 See infra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
"See SUMMA, supra note 14, at II-H, Q. 64, Art. 5; see also GLENN, supra note
20, at 228 (explaining that suicide, for example, constitutes sin against God, nature,
and community).
2 See SUzMA, supra note 14, at IT-IT, Q. 122, Art. 2 and I-IT, Q. 100, Art. 6.
Id. at I-H, Q. 81, Art. 2; CONCISE TRANSLATION, supra note 29, at 400
(commenting on Q. 81 and stating that "[v]irtues make men and their actions
good.").
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ity is injustice to other human persons. 4 Right reason tells us
that a basic human purpose is life in society with others and that
a disposition to treat others with equal regard (justice) is a pre-
requisite for life in common with them.35 An unjust act, there-
fore, is one that takes a disproportionate share of some created
good at the expense of the right of another.5 Every allocation we
make between ourselves and others, no matter how remote from
public scrutiny, is subject to moral evaluation for its justice or
injustice."' If the act is unjust, it is immoral and causes disorder
in our characters.38 By committing unjust acts we define our-
selves as persons who do not acknowledge the moral equality of
others.39
St. Thomas' vision of morality is widely and correctly
thought to have an "objective" basis." Right and wrong are not a
34 SUMMA, supra note 14, at II-II, Q. 59, Art. 4; see also R.J. Araujo, Thomas
Aquinas: Prudence, Justice, and the Law, 40 LOY. L. REV. 897, 909 (1995) (stating
that according to method developed by Aquinas, goal of living moral life in which
good is sought and evil is avoided is identified with justice). Justice is viewed as the
object which directs "man in his relations with others." Id. (quoting SUMMA, supra
note 14, at I-II, Q. 57, Art. 1). See generally TREATISE, supra note 25 (discussing
justice as social virtue most relevant to law because law directs society or commu-
nity).
' See SUMMA, supra note 14, at I-II, Q. 95, Art. 3 and II-II, Q. 57, Art. 1; see
also Araujo, supra note 34, at 909 ("At the heart of the interpersonal relationship,
and therefore justice, is 'a kind of equality-the name of justice implies equality be-
cause 'things are adjusted ... when they are made equal .... '") (quoting SUMMA, su-
pra note 14, at I-II, Q. 57, Art. 1).
3' SUMMA, supra note 14, at II-II, Q. 58, Art. 10-11.
37 See TREATISE, supra note 25, at 67 (discussing virtue as interior disposition
that enables people to do the right things). "[T]he virtue of Justice is a perfection of
man's relationship with others in regard to goods and services." Id.
38 "As individual persons, we are each entitled to equal treatment to pursue the
goods and opportunities which enable us to flourish as the beings God created us to
be. But our liberty to pursue these goods and opportunities does not give anyone the
license 'to infringe the equal rights of others.' " Araujo, supra note 34, at 921-22
(quoting Philip A. Hamburger, Natural Rights, Natural Law, and American Consti-
tutions, 102 YALE L.J. 907, 924 (1993)); see also DAVID GRANFIELD, THE INNER
EXPERIENCE OF LAW: A JURISPRUDENCE OF SUBJECTIVITY 68 (1988). 'If one sins
against the laws of proportion and gives something too big to something too small to
carry it - ... too big meals to too small a body, too big powers to too small a soul - the
result is bound to be a complete upset." Id. (quoting PLATO, THE LAWS (691 c.)).
39 "Justice is a habit whereby a man renders to each one his due by a constant
and perpetual will." SUMMA, supra note 14, at II-II, Q. 58, Art. 1. A person who dis-
regards the rights of others also disregards the common good and in so doing injures
the rights of others. Araujo, supra note 34, at 922. A person infringing on the rights
of others, in turn, harms oneself. Id.
40 SUMMA, supra note 14, at I-II, Q. 1, Art. 7-8 (specifying that there is universal
final purpose to human life).
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matter of emotion, but depend on goods given to human beings in
Creation.4 Even the relatively subjective task of building a vir-
tuous character has an objective quality, since the virtues to be
inculcated are habits promoting respect for objectively given
human purposes.42 In addition to its stress on the objective, St.
Thomas' equation of morality with recta ratio, or "right reason,"
means that the scope of morality is as broad as all human rea-
soning. Every human act, according to St. Thomas, is subject to
evaluation for whether it is moral. 3
Let us turn now to the question of how Catholic tradition
has understood this objective morality as giving the civil law its
normative direction. One might suppose, since the Catholic ap-
proach to morality as seen in St. Thomas is so comprehensive,
unified, and purportedly objective in its scope, that objective mo-
rality would subsume the civil law into itself, providing a defi-
nite answer based on its characteristic reasoning to every ques-
tion of law. To test this notion, however, consider what would
happen to the welfare of the Nation if a team of moral theologi-
ans replaced Congress!
Catholicism has throughout its history rejected any such
idea.4 St. Thomas, and the Church generally, treat the civil law
as related to, but clearly distinguishable from morality.45 If the
nature of the distinction between the two terms is first ascer-
tained, the nature of their relationship can also be described.
That relationship will disclose the normative direction which
41 See TREATISE, supra note 25, at 76-77 (explaining that despite intrinsic drive
for happiness, humans must act according to what is right and what is wrong).
"[Tibroughout our lives we are faced with making many decisions in which the mo-
tivation must be the objective good and not simply the desire for happiness." Id.
12 For an enlightening extended treatment of the meaning of subjective appro-
priation in understanding law and morality, see GRANFIELD, supra note 38.
43 SUM MA, supra note 14, at I-H, Q. 18, Art. 9; see also GLENN, supra note 20, at
114-16 (detailing that every human act performed is either in accord with right rea-
son or contrary to it; no act is considered neutral, they are either morally good or
evil).
" This position is already reflected in New Testament Scripture. See Matthew
22:21 ("Then pay Caesar what is due Caesar, and pay God what is due God."); 1 Pe-
ter 2:11-17 ("Submit yourself to every human institution for the sake of the Lord.");
Romans 13:1-7 ("Every person must submit to the supreme authorities. There is no
authority but by act of God, and the existing authorities are instituted by him.").
" This assumption is clearly at the basis of St. Thomas Aquinas's thought on
civil law. SUMIMA, supra note 14, at I-H, Q. 91, Art. 2-4 and -I, Q. 95, Art. 2; see
also TREATISE, supra note 25, at 84 (explaining that in addition to existence of Eter-
nal Law and Natural Law, human determinations (human laws) are necessary and
should be worked out by practical reason).
1997]
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objective morality provides for the civil law.
In undertaking this analysis, it is good to begin with the
early Christians, who were the first members of the Church to
consciously perceive the civil law as a phenomenon susceptible to
moral justification as well as critique." The early Christians had
a strong moral sense, and they looked to the Church for compre-
hensive guidance in giving content to their moral lives, tending
to remove themselves from the general run of society.47 But,
when they were called before the Law, they acknowledged the
state as having authority independent of the Church or the
Church's blessing. When St. Polycarp, for instance, was brought
before the Roman magistrate in the Second Century, he said:
'You, ... I indeed consider entitled to an explanation; for we have
been trained to render honor, in so far as it does not harm us, to
magistrates and authorities appointed by God."48 Polycarp re-
fused to comply with the magistrate's unjust request that he
worship the emperor, but in principle he conceded the authority
of the civil law.49
The early Christians saw the civil law as ordained by God to
preserve the external order of civil society.5" As such, it had a lo-
cus of authority separate from moral reasoning about individual
416 See Francis Bowes Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974, 980 (1932)
(detailing that by Twelfth Century canonists were already influencing law).
[Canonists] had long insisted that the mental element [of legal culpability]
was the real criterion of guilt and under their influence the conception of
subjective blameworthiness as the foundation for legal guilt was making it-
self strongly felt .... [Moreover] the early Anglo-Saxon law [allowing pun-
ishment of death] violated the idea of moral guilt derived from the canon-
ists.
Id.
47 The early Christians can be understood as an apocalyptic sect. See WAYNE A.
MEEKS, THE MORAL WORLD OF THE FIRST CHRISTIANS 13, 102-04 (1986) (clarifying
that conscious "resocialization" of Christianity in many ways presupposed uncon-
scious "socialization" of contemporary moral expectation).
48 The Martyrdom of Polycarp, in 6 ANCIENT CHRISTIAN WRITERS: THE WORKS
OF THE FATHERS IN TRANSLATION 95 (James A. Kleist trans., Johannes Quasten and
Joseph C. Plumpe eds., 1948).
Id.
50 See R.A. MARKUS, SEACULUM: HISTORY AND SOCIETY IN THE THEOLOGY OF ST.
AUGUSTINE 84 (1970) (noting early Christian tradition whereby purpose of state was
"to deal with the disorganisation and conflict resulting from the Fall: to prevent men
from devouring each other like fish."); see also SUMMA, supra note 14, at I-II, Q. 92,
Art. 1 (stating "the proper effect of the law is to lead its subjects to their proper vir-
tue: and since virtue is that which makes its subjects good, it follows that the proper
effect of law is to make those to whom it is given, good ....") (emphasis in original).
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choice and independent of the Church's delegation. This insight
lies behind the more systematic body of thought on the nature
and role of the civil law one finds in St. Augustine.51 St.
Augustine, like St. Thomas, believes that life in society is a basic
and indispensable human good.52 This human purpose, however,
is only perfectly fulfilled where there is perfect justice.53 But,
such justice transcends the world, in its sin and imperfection,
that we encounter.56 Such justice is something that Christians
strive for during their lives on earth, but that they will only ex-
perience in heaven, which St. Augustine understands as the per-
fectly just society or the "City of God."55 Perfect justice is, then,
only possible for St. Augustine, where there is perfect love.55
The problem of civil law, for St. Augustine, is the problem of
how human beings are to organize the civil society under short-
run temporal conditions of sin and imperfection, making perfect
justice far from possible.57 Specifically, he asks how society is to
rl See CITY OF GOD, supra note 14; see also MARKUS, supra note 50, at 78
(explaining that Augustine believed that all order is from God, and both cosmic or-
der and idea of human society as way of order was commonplace in classical
thought).
CITY OF GOD, supra note 14, at bk. XIX, ch. 12-14 (discussing good of earthly
city); see also HERBERT A. DEANE, THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL IDEAS OF ST.
AUGUSTINE 9 (1963) (stating that Augustine follows traditional Christian notion
that society and social life are natural to mankind); see also MARKUS, supra note 50,
at 99 (detailing that life in society was seen as necessary because without it no hu-
man maturity was possible).
CITY OF GOD, supra note 14, at bk. XIX, ch. 5. St. Augustine believed that
there are four virtues in life: temperance, fortitude, justice, and prudence. DEANE,
supra note 52, at 83. Virtue is defined as the perfect love of God and therefore these
four virtues are forms of love. Id. at 93. Justice is defined as "love serving God only,
ruling well to all else, subject to man." Id.
CITY OF GOD, supra note 14, at bk. XIV, ch. 28 and bk. XIX, chs. 17 & 27.
G Id. at bk. XIV, ch. 28, bk. XVIII, ch. 1 and bk. XX, ch. 1; see also Arthur J.
Burke, Moral Foundations of Constitutional Thought: Current Problems, Augustian
Prospects, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1421, 1425 (1991). St. Augustine sets out two societies,
the debased city of man and the eternally peaceful City of God. Id. The citizens of
the City of God attempt to order their lives in accord with the divine revelation and
true good. Id. Citizens of the city of man seek out surrogates for God in personal af-
fections and passion. Id. Given the flawed nature of humans, St. Augustine con-
cluded that establishing a City of God on earth is both impossible and contrary to
the nature of man. Id.
6 CITY OF GOD, supra note 14, at bk. XV, ch. 22. Perfect justice is only found in
a community made up of individuals who serve and love God, but this community is
only Possible in the City of God. DEANE, supra note 52, at 119.
See DEANE, supra note 52, at 98 (discussing that because Adam allowed sin to
enter human world and corrupt his descendants, true justice is only found in City of
God); see also Anton-Hermann Chroust, The Fundamental Ideas in St. Augustine's
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organize itself when many are not willing to participate in the
intrinsic pursuit of justice (i.e., the fair and equal treatment of
one another), but instead seek to arrogate unlimited power and
possessions. 5
St. Augustine sees the authority of the state and civil law as
a necessary external use of coercion to ensure a provisional tem-
poral ordering of the human community under these conditions. 9
The authority of the state, for St. Augustine, is a coercive
authority which restrains sinful human natures to create a
semblance of order.6" What, more precisely, is the goal of the
civil law in this scheme?
For St. Augustine, the civil law seeks to effect a minimal
fulfillment of the public requirements of justice.61 Its content,
then, depends on morality or "natural law," since it is through
moral reasoning that the requirements of justice become evi-
dent.62 Generally, justice requires that each give the other his or
her due or, put differently, that each treat the other as he or she
wishes to be treated him or herself.63 But, in order to formulate
particular content for the civil law, the civil authority must
make an additional determination of how much of the compre-
Philosophy of Law, 18 AM. J. JURIS. 57, 72-73 (1973) (positing that although man
cannot attain Divine Wisdom or attain ultimate perfection expressed by lex aeterna,
human or temporal laws not derived from or sanctioned by divine or natural law are
unjust and should not be obeyed).
58 CITY OF GOD, supra note 14, at bk. XIV, ch. I and bk. XV, ch. 1. St. Augustine
uses the word "lust" to describe all earthly desires. DEANE, supra note 52, at 44-45.
There is a lust for power, money and all temporal goods. Id. There is no limit to sin-
ful man's desire for material goods. Id.
r9 CITY OF GOD, supra note 14, at bk. XIV, ch. 13 (describing threat of loss of
temporal things as offering overriding human motivation among mass of unre-
deemed humanity).
0 MARKUS, supra note 50, at 84. While state and civil law do not help the
"right" order of the world, their task is to minimize disorder to the public. Id. Politi-
cal authority is not natural to man, but is the result of his sinful condition. Id.
61 CITY OF GOD, supra note 14, at bk. XIX, ch. 21. "We are not to reckon as right
such human laws as are iniquitous, since even unjust lawgivers themselves call a
right [ I only what derives from the fountainhead of justice .... [Ilt follows beyond
question that where there is no justice, there is no commonwealth." Id.; see also
MARKUS, supra note 50, at 88 ("No legislation that fails to measure up to the re-
quirements of the eternal law can be just, or indeed deserve the name of law ....
Justice is almost synonymous with the right ordering of human affairs .... ").
62 CITY OF GOD, supra note 14, at bk. XIX, ch. 16; see also St. Augustine, De Lib-
era Arbitrio, in THE FATHERS OF THE CHURCH bk. 1, ch.6 (R. Russell trans., 1968)
[hereinafter De Libera Arbitrio]. Augustine recognizes the existence of natural law,
a basic moral law written in the hearts of all men, and distinct from human or di-
vine Y revealed law. DEANE, supra note 52, at 85.
De Libera Arbitrio, supra note 62, at bk. I, ch. 13.
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hensive moral scope of justice's requirements can and should be
accomplished by the coercive power of the state.6
According to St. Augustine, the civil law should seek to effect
justice only insofar as it concerns temporal goods, such as life
and property.5 Moreover, St. Augustine would assert that rights
in these goods should be protected only to the degree that is
compatible with an effective rule of law, given the degree of law-
abidingness in the given jurisdiction.6  As a rule, St. Augustine
would admit that the civil law can prevent only fairly gross vio-
lations of justice.67 For example, St. Augustine considers killing
in self-defense morally wrong (here he differs from Aquinas), but
he does not believe that such killing can realistically be outlawed
without giving rise to more egregious violations of justice.68
The civil law is distinct from morality for St. Augustine. It
enforces a strictly limited range of the norms of morality-only
those dealing with justice issues definite enough to be considered
public-and, given the realities of human society, the civil law
must be prepared to accept compromises in the enforcement of
even these norms.69 Finally, the civil law differs from morality in
aiming not to make human beings "good" but only to keep a pro-
visional peace, so that those with the grace to desire the good
may pursue a virtuous life in peace.7"
These distinctions all presuppose that civil law is fundamen-
tally related to morality. According to St. Augustine, the civil
law retains its validity precisely and only insofar as it fulfills the
moral norms of public justice, which is its divinely appointed
64 Chroust, supra note 57, at 74. Human law is not concerned with the promo-
tion of moral virtue, but with the preservation of people and order by preventing,
deterring, and punishing the worst abuses and "crudest social maladjustment" that
might endanger and destroy peace and order. Id- Temporal law is needed to pre-
serve a minimum of civil peace and to secure the survival of the secular society. Id.
'5CITY OF GOD, supra note 14, at bk. XIX, chs. 13 & 17.
' Id. at bk. XIX, ch. 7 (expounding law as kind of compromise between human
wills).
67See id. at bk. XIX, ch. 21.
'5De Libera Arbitrio, supra note 62, at bk. 1, ch. 5.
M iARKUS, supra note 50, at 89. External law cannot make man good, but can
secure public order, and property rights. Id. St. Augustine, in his early works sug-
gests that human law is concerned with external law and is powerless and neutral
with regard to internal propositions of men, whether they act in conformity or break
it. Id. Later, Augustine shifts his view of the purpose of human legislation and em-
phasizes the external character of the law. Id.
' The purpose of civil law is to help in avoiding conflict and to maintain
"earthly peace." MARKUS, supra note 50, at 89.
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purpose.7 He, therefore, concludes that "an unjust law is no
law."72 St. Augustine recognizes, moreover, that the state and
the civil law are themselves often subverted by human sinful-
ness, becoming the engines of the greed and lust for domination
by bad men.73 St. Augustine sees the state as frequently akin to
a "band of robbers," in which case the civil law is not law at all,
but in fact a form of violence.74
Returning to St. Thomas Aquinas, we find a complementary,
but broader Catholic endorsement of civil law. St. Thomas ac-
cepts roughly the schema which St. Augustine devised for under-
standing the civil law, but he modifies and extends it, to reflect a
more optimistic philosophy of human nature.
St. Thomas offers a richer and fuller concept of the temporal
peace, which is the goal of the civil law, than does St. Augustine.
St. Augustine assumed that the civil law was made necessary by
sin. 5 St. Thomas postulates that it is more than a necessary re-
sponse to sin, that, more fundamentally, it is an essential re-
sponse to humanity's whole, created nature; a nature that is in-
herently social.76 For St. Thomas, the civil law's purposes
include the Common Good in its entirety, not just freedom from
fear of grand larceny, rape, and murder, as it is for St.
71 CITY OF GOD, supra note 14, at bk. XIX, ch. 21 (stating that people and gov-
ernment devoid of justice cannot constitute commonwealth, but rather constitute a
mob); see also MARKUS, supra note 50, at 88 ("Justice and human law considered as
its embodiment and instrument are in Augustine's early writings part of the ladder
of man's ascent to God.").
72 De Libera Arbitrio, supra note 62, at bk. 1, ch. 5.
7" See Jean Bethke Elshtain, Sovereign God, Sovereign State, Sovereign Self, 66
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1355, 1357 (1991). The distinctive mark of the city of man was
his greed and lust for possessions, which presumed a right of exploitation and be-
came the foundation of all human relationships. Id.
71 CITY OF GOD, supra note 14, at bk. XIX chs. 21 & 24; see also SUMMA, supra
note 14, at I-II, Q. 96, Art. 4 ("[unjust laws] are acts of violence rather than laws.").
75 See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
76 See supra notes 26-39 and accompanying text.
For Aquinas, natural law is what reason tells us to do or to avoid in order
to function well as people. It is not, he explains, a detailed list of instruc-
tions for acting in the multitude of different circumstances .... It is a
framework within which people can make particular choices on particular
occasions in particular circumstances. And for this reason it needs to be
supplemented by sound practical reasoning, the working of conscience, and
by what Aquinas calls 'human law,' i.e. institutional legislation ('laws of the
land') designed to promote well-being of people in concrete societies.
BRIAN DAVIES, THE THOUGHTS OF THOMAS AQUINAS 246 (1992).
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Augustine.7" For St. Thomas, the civil law is a suitable tool to di-
rect all common action in the community aimed at fulfilling basic
human needs and common interests.78 Ultimately, St. Thomas
understands the civil law as assisting, in both its positive and
negative functions, the members of the community in reaching
their transcendent "Ultimate End" as persons.79 Its observance
conduces them to the fullness of a virtuous character."
But, St. Thomas, like St. Augustine, does not see the civil
law as receiving its content directly from morality, or as embody-
ing all of morality.81 He, too, teaches that the civil law's scope is
limited to that which is suitable for enactment by public author-
ity and within the capacity of the subject members of the com-
munity. 2 While St. Thomas allows the purposes of civil law a
scope wider than St. Augustine's notion of public justice, encom-
passing aspects of all the virtues, he stops short of suggesting
that law should enforce the whole of the virtuous life. 3 Rather,
he believes that it ought to enforce only as much of the virtuous
life as is socially relevant, since the organization of social life of-
fers the basic justification for law.' St. Thomas believes that the
civil law ought not to restrain private vice.'
What is "public" vice and virtue and what is "private" follows
for St. Thomas, from what the society is morally strong enough
7 SUMMA, supra note 14, at I-11, Q. 95, Art. 3.
[Mian has a natural aptitude for virtue; but the perfection of virtue must
be acquired by man by means of some kind of training .... [Tihis kind of
training, which compels through fear of punishment, is the discipline of
laws. Therefore, in order that man might have peace and virtue, it was
necessary for laws to be framed.
Id. at I-1, Q. 95, Art. 1.78 id
"
79 See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text. The Ultimate End for man is
happiness, and Aquinas explains that "man's last end [or Ultimate End] is the un-
created good, namely, God, Who alone by His infinite goodness can perfectly satisfy
man's will." SU MIA, supra note 14, at I-II, Q. 3, Art. 1.
' SUM A, supra note 14, at I-I, Q. 92, Art. 1. Aquinas places human law in the
framework of the plan of God, who wants man to achieve eternal happiness by
choosing to love and obey Him. Human law and the state exist to promote the com-
mon good and thus to help man achieve his end of eternal happiness with God.
CHARLES RIcE, 50 QUESTIONS ON THE NATURAL LAW 70 (1995).
8' SUMA, supra note 14, at I-H, Q. 96, Arts. 1-3.82Id.
83 See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
SSUMA, supra note 14, at I-I, Q. 96, Arts. 1-3.
aId. Aquinas postulates that if civil law is too restrictive, imperfect men will
rebel against it, which would lead to even greater harm. Id. at I-IT, Q. 96, Art. 2.
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to make its common concern. He suggests, for example, that
some societies might need legally to permit some behaviors, in
spite of their vicious moral character, where their prohibition
would only lead to greater disorders.8' For St. Augustine, the
practical challenge of lawmaking was how to proffer security in
life and other material goods to wicked men in such a way as to
advance social cooperation.87 For St. Thomas, it is, rather, how
prudently to moderate the law's moral demands, so as not to
overtax the average person's capacity of intellect and will to
master unruly appetites.8 His insight is that if the lawmaker
tries for too much, the weak will either disregard the law or in-
vent new evils in trying to avoid liability.89
To sum up, St. Augustine's and St. Thomas' view on the role
of objective morality as a source of normative direction for civil
law: both thinkers understand the human good of living in soci-
ety as an objective good, accessible to reason. In connection with
this good, both find a moral duty to treat others with equal moral
regard or justice. Thus, the duties of justice are objective duties.
Their enforcement should occur, they believe, when an injury be-
comes sufficiently material to be publicly cognizable. It is this
mandate which both gives the law its fundamental normative di-
rection and justifies its authority.
These brief outlines of the positions of St. Thomas and St.
Augustine prepare us to address more specifically the relevance
of the objective norms of morality for the civil law's response to
abortion.
Both positions support the use of the civil law to restrain
abortion for moral reasons, but neither does simply because the
act of abortion is immoral. Both, for example, would have moral
difficulties with abortion as one of a much wider class of acts in
conflict with the basic human purpose of procreation, but neither
would necessarily call for the legal restraint of abortion for this
reason alone.
The necessity of a civil law response to abortion flows from
the conflict it represents between claims. Morally, the resolution
8 Id.
87 CITY OF GOD, supra note 14, at bk. XIV, ch. 13.
8 SUMMA, supra note 14, at I-Il, Q. 96, Art. 2 ("Wherefore human laws do not
forbid all vices, from which the virtuous abstain, but only the more grevious vices,
from which it is possible for the majority to abstain.").
8 Id.
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of this conflict is a question of justice. The injustice of taking the
life of the child for the incidental benefit of the mother and, indi-
rectly, for society's convenience ignores the moral equality of the
child, as person, and is material enough of all within the scope of
a publicly cognizable injustice.
If there is any doubt that St. Thomas and St. Augustine
would hold the life-taking of the unborn child as a public injus-
tice (i.e., a violation of rights constituting the moral order of the
temporal community) in today's society, it can be noted that
abortions in our society are widely performed and publicized,
under the auspices of important quasi-public medical institu-
tions." The prudential calculus of whether the law necessarily
must assume the burden of enforcement on a particular moral
issue (a step which both St. Augustine and St. Thomas count as
an important mediating step in thinking about law) does not
leave significant room for tolerating abortion, although it is at
this stage of analysis that the Catholic can consider compromises
for the legal regulation of abortion in drafting legislation. 9
The Catholic position has only small room for tolerating
abortion on practical grounds because the authority of law de-
pends on its dedication to the fundamental moral equality of
human persons. The deliberate exclusion of a sizable class of
persons from the protection of so basic a right as life is not just a
particular concrete wrong, but a serious threat to the law's fun-
damental claim to legitimacy. The problem is compounded when
the law positively confers an immunity on another class from le-
gal liability for acts to dominate (kill) members of the class ex-
cluded from protection.92
' See Abortion Numbers Continue to Decline, WIS. ST. J., Sept. 13, 1996, at 3B
(stating there were 12,782 abortions in Wisconsin in 1995, 13,396 in 1994 and
17,986 in 1988); Melissa Williams, Pill Expected to Make Abortions More Available:
Providers and Opponents of the Procedure Disagree About Whether the Number of
Abortions in Texas Will Increase, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Sept. 26, 1996, at 3
(stating there were 87,501 abortions in Texas in 1995).
91 The recent decision of the German Constitutional Court on abortion upholds
the value of human life from the beginning of gestation, while avoiding requiring the
criminalization of all abortion, yet not, in any obvious way, violating Catholic moral
principles. Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 88, 203, 11 (1992); see
also Deborah Goldberg, Developments in German Abortion Law: A U.S. Perspective,
5 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 531, 532 (1995) (noting that although German Constitutional
Court in its May 1993 decision "recognized for the first time that it is a woman's ul-
timate responsibility to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy," the "reformed
law did not meet the minimum constitutional standards for the protection of life.").
92 An objective basis, and not mere societal election, exists, in this view, for
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The objective moral norm leading the Church to call for the
legal prohibition of abortion is that of justice.93 A review of the
thought of St. Thomas and St. Augustine shows that the
Church's concern with the issue rests only in part on a stance of
solidarity with the identifiable unborn persons threatened with
the deprivation of life.94 The Church is also concerned with the
ramifications of abortion on demand for the fundamental legiti-
macy of the civil law.9" With all allowances for practical media-
tion, if the legal system finally lets go of its grounding in the mo-
rality of justice, it becomes, at its very root, in the Catholic view,
a tool of oppression for the powerful who happen to control it and
who, in St. Augustine's words, resemble a band of robbers.96
A. The Objection that the Law's Secular Character Excludes
Catholicism's Approach to Law and Morality
In moving from the Augustinian-Thomist scheme of thought
to the concrete challenge of legislating against abortion, the
Catholic in contemporary society encounters the objection that
Catholic proposals are ineligible for recognition because they are
religiously grounded.97 The law, it is said, is essentially secular
holding that the act of intentionally interrupting the gestational state upon which
the child's life depends makes the agent at least prima facie morally responsible for
the child's death, whereas the failure to positively extend assistance to a child in
physical need, even with fatal consequences for the child, does not have this signifi-
cance. The opposing view often dominates contemporary discussion. See LAWRENCE
H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 243-45 (1985).
93 The Catholic position is supported by Natural Law theorists who believe that
every law must have moral worth. See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL
RIGHTS 26 (1980).
94 SUMMA, supra note 14, at I-I, Q. 95, Art. 2 (stating that chief arm of human
law is to forbid vices which hurt others).
9" See Charles Curran, Encyclical is Positive, Problematic, NAT'L CATH. REP.,
Apr. 14, 1995, at 4 ("[Pope] John Paul II maintains that civil law must respect and
promote the basic right to life."). In his most recent encyclical, the Pope opposed
abortion and abortion-allowing laws vigorously. See id. "The present situation of
permissive abortion laws in many countries shows the presence of ethical relativism
and the separation of freedom from truth." Id.
See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
97 See PETER S. WENZ, ABORTION RIGHTS AS RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 175-76 (1992).
The author cites Justice Stevens in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986), overruled by Planned Parenthood of South-
eastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), who stated that "attributing
personhood 'during the entire period from the moment of conception until the mo-
ment of birth' rests on 'a ... theological argument.' " Id. at 176. Justice Stevens
claimed that this was strictly a religious position and that the issue necessitated an
elevation of secular state interests. Id.
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and may not validate religious reasons.!
Catholics must learn to refute this objection, if they are to
preserve their distinctive mode of reasoning about law and mo-
rality, in the contemporary situation. In order to do so, Catholics
must realize that they face not just ad hoc resistance to a par-
ticular position they take, but a deep-seated difference in ways of
grasping the relationship between law and human values. To
answer the objection, Catholics must learn to be effective in
criticizing the sort of thinking it represents.
To understand this prevailing view, one may conveniently
begin with the thought of John Locke, who lived from 1632 to
1704.99 Locke, as is well known, has had an enormous, in some
ways beneficial, influence on American political institutions."0
In grounding the legitimacy of civil law, Locke does not be-
gin with the objective norms of justice, but rather with a hypo-
thetical agreement among the governed, which he calls the
"social contract."" Using the analogy of bargains, Locke imag-
ines that civil society comes into existence when individuals
agree to give up a measure of freedom in exchange for security.0 2
The power they give up, they cede over to the majority rule of the
society.0 3
For Locke, the test of the legitimacy of law is the majority
will."° If the majority wills it, the law is legitimate, even if the
'3 Id. at 176 (concluding that enactments reflecting theological position would
unconstitutionally establish religion).
' See generally Peter Laslett, Introduction, Second Treatise, supra note 15; J.W.
GOUGH, JOHN LOCKE's POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (1973); MARTIN SELINGER, THE
LIBERAL POLITICS OF JOHN LOCKE (1968); GOPAL JREENIVASAN, THE LIMITS OF
LOCKEAN RIGHTS IN PROPERTY (1995); John Locke, The Natural Right to Property,
in READINGS IN PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (John Arthur & William H. Shaw eds., 1984)
[hereinafter Natural Right]; John Locke, Essays on the Law of Nature, in NATURAL
LAW IN POLITICAL THOUGHT 91 (Paul E. Sigmund ed., 1971) [hereinafter Essays].
200 "In spirit, the seventeenth-century English philosopher John Locke ranks
among the founders of the American political tradition. His liberal political philoso-
phy haunts American politics like a family ghost." Stephen L. Newman, Locke's Two
Treatises and Contemporary Thought: Freedom, Community, and the Liberal Tradi-
tion, in JOHN LOCKE'S TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 172 (Edward J. Harpham
ed., 1992) [hereinafter TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT].10' Second Treatise, supra note 15, at bk. II, ch. II 14, & VIII 97.
02 See GOUGH, supra note 99, at 32. A major foundation of such an agreement,
the social contract, is the consent of the people. Id.
'0 Second Treatise, supra note 15, at bk. II, ch. XI 134; see also SELINGER, supra
note 99, at 91-94 (discussing Locke's belief that "common superior" in society is es-
sential in order to judge between men).
'1 Second Treatise, supra note 15, at bk. II, ch. XI 135; see also GOUGH, supra
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individual reasons, by St. Thomas' and St. Augustine's stan-
dards, that it is objectively unjust."5 The exceptions are certain
narrowly defined "natural rights" which survive the entry into
the social contract, most notably the right to private property
and the right to individual choice in matters of religious wor-
ship.10
Locke strongly affirms the existence of God, but does not
understand morality as being grounded in responsibility for the
goods of Creation.' Rather, he sees it as grounded in the essen-
tially arbitrary will of God and reinforced by the sanctions of
heaven and hell.0 8 He views human ideas of morality as mere
convention supported by the sanction of public scorn."'
Locke admits that the civil law ought to pursue what God's
will calls for, but this is because the natural consequences of not
doing so will be negative over the long run due to the punish-
ments God has built into nature; the purpose of majoritarian
decision making being to maximize beneficial consequences for
the community.10 The mere fact, however, that the civil law de-
parts from divinely revealed norms is not itself a basis for chal-
lenging the legitimacy of the law where majority will is in effect
and the specific "natural rights" mentioned before have not been
violated."'
note 99, at 32 (stating that only at inauguration of state by social contract is una-
nimity required, whereas afterward decisions of majority are binding).
101 See Essays, supra note 99, at 93 (stating that utility is result of obedience to
law even if law is against one's own personal interests).
10 See Second Treatise, supra note 15, at bk. II, ch. V and bk. II, ch. XI 139.
17 An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, bk. I, chs. 3, 5-8, 12-13, & 18,
in THE LOcKE READER 190-95 (John W. Yolton ed., 1977) [hereinafter Human Un-
derstanding]; see also Eldon Eisenach, Religion and Locke's Two Treatises of Gov-
ernment, in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, supra note 100, at 50, 70-80.
108 Human Understanding, supra note 107, at 195-201 (bk. II, chs. 4-16, 28).
109 Id.
110 Id. at 190 (bk. I, ch. 3) (explaining that God has imprinted upon man idea of
Himself and all men's actions must be done in obedience to His will; men are
warned not to let 'their appetites cross their duty"); see also WENZ, supra note 97,
at 170-84 (discussing dangers resulting from failure to observe God's laws). Wenz
cites the Old Testament in his analysis and explains that the destruction of cities
and the successive plagues visited upon Egypt were examples of such punishments.
Id. at 183.
" See SELINGER, supra note 99, at 305. According to Locke, in order to serve
any substantial human purpose, morality must often be compatible with expediency
and such a principle is illustrated through the majority rule. Id. The decision of the
greater number prevails over that of the smaller and there is a moral right pos-
sessed by the majority to be decently governed. Id. Instead of suppressing divinely
revealed norms the deference always given to the majority actually preserves moral-
[Vol. 71:515
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Although Locke would consider "life" a natural right deserv-
ing prima facie respect by the law, this right belongs only to per-
sons."' His system does not provide a strong basis for conceding
that status to the unborn child, now that in our era the child's
membership in the community of those bearing legal rights has
been challenged. In keeping with their stress on grounding re-
spect for others in the objective good of Creation, St. Thomas and
St. Augustine understand the human person as on a path of
"exitus-reditus," or emergence from and return to God in the cy-
cle of birth and death, and creation and redemption. 3 As a con-
sequence, under their schema, powerholders easily identify with
the child from its earliest beginnings and recognize the moral
need to treat it as an equal." Locke, by contrast, conceptualizes
the prototypical person as a bargaining, property owning adult."5
His model tends to provide less of a basis for universal recogni-
tion of personhood. Moreover, since the legitimacy of the law is
grounded, for Locke, in the will of the majority and hot in the
ity. Id.
112 See GOUGH, supra note 99, at 31. Locke writes of government as the protec-
tor of life. Id. In his analysis, men in a state of nature (already born and functioning
within society) give up their individual power to a government that protects their
lives. Id. The preservation of such life is a primary function of society. Id.; see also
Natural Right, supra note 99, at 530-31 (explaining that each person has duty to
preserve mankind and not to take away life, liberty, health, limb or goods of an-
other). Locke writes of the "person" as one's neighbor (one's fellow man), an entity
worthy of protection. Id. at 531. Locke writes that natural reason "tells us that men
being once born have a right to their preservation." Id. at 533 (emphasis added).1 St. Thomas develops this fundamental underlying vision of the human con-
dition in a number of dichotomies that pervade his scheme of thought, including
those defined by the paired terms of Creation and Providence, SUMMA, supra note
14, at I-I1, Q. 106, Arts. 3-4 and Q. 107, Arts. 1-3, and Nature and Grace, SUMMA,
supra note 14, at I-II, Q. 109, Art. 2. As a pattern of returning to God, St. Thomas
conceives of the life of the Christian as a "journey" of faith. Id. at II-II, Q. 1, Art. 1.
St. Augustine offers a parallel pattern in his vision of the providential guidance by
God of the human community in history. CITY OF GOD, supra note 14, at bk. I-X.
114 See DANIEL CALLAGHAN, ABORTION: LAW, CHOICE AND MORALITY 418 (1970)
(citing Pius XII that "the unborn child is a human being in the same degree and by
the same title as his mother") Callaghan discusses the moral policy to protect all in-
nocent life and cites one of the principles of the Catholic Hospital Association of the
United States and Canada that: "[e]very unborn child must be regarded as a human
person, with all the rights of a human person, from the moment of conception." Id.
at 419.
15 Locke's interpretation of a person as being a bargaining, property owning
adult mirrors the "achievement view" which is a pro-choice position in the abortion
debate. See STEPHEN SCHWARZ, THE MORAL QUESTION OF ABORTION 103 (1990).
This view states that "only human beings who have achieved a certain degree of de-
velopment of the present immediate capacity to function as persons count as real
persons." Id-
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objective goodness of persons,116 his system is more open to es-
sentially arbitrary legislative classifications.
The Lockean view continues to shape, in part, the contempo-
rary American political system. A contemporary political phi-
losopher, John Rawls, has created a theory of justice, perpetuat-
ing the Lockean view, and updating it to more closely reflect
common contemporary intuitions."7 Rawls, like Locke, uses the
model of bargain as a basis for legitimating law. But, unlike
Locke, he is distrustful of the majority will, and he wishes to
provide certain moral limits to its power over minorities."8
However, in keeping with his individualism, Rawls is unwilling
to make a system of objective human values the basis of a justice
evaluation of the civil law passed by the majority, as would St.
Augustine and St. Thomas."' So, instead of appealing to the
"objective" requirements of justice, he derives limits from a
principle of fairness, making obligatory the requirements to
which parties bargaining at the time of the hypothetical social
contact (in the "Original Position") would agree, if they did not
comprehend fully the role they would have in society (he places
them behind a "veil of ignorance")."' The rules Rawls purports
to derive in this way include political equality and a prima facie
economic equality. 2' Every person should have equal freedom to
116 See supra notes 104-105 and accompanying text; see also Natural Right, su-
pra note 99, at 530 (stating that by investing his own labor in a pursuit, each indi-
vidual can make what was common property into his personal property). Locke lim-
its this right, however, by stating that a man could not labor for more than he could
use. Id. at 540.
117 Rawls specifically identifies his theory as a further development of "the fa-
miliar theory of the social contract as found, say, in Locke." THEORY OF JUSTICE, su-
pra note 15, at 11.
1"8 Id. at 228-34. "Whenever questions of justice are raised, we are not to go by
the strength of feeling but must aim instead for the greater justice of the legal or-
der." Id. at 230.
119 Id. at 142-45.
120 Id at 13-14, 17-21, 136-42. The parties are prevented.from knowing about the
citizens they represent by what Rawls terms a "veil of ignorance." Id. at 137. Infor-
mation regarding a particular citizen's race, ethnicity and gender is withheld from
the parties. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 24-25 (1993) [hereinafter PO-
LITICAL LIBERALISM]. In addition, parties are prevented from realizing the skills,
abilities, tastes.or strengths they possess. Id. at 272; see also Gary C. Leedes, Mo-
rality and the Law Symposium Review Essay: Rawls's Excessively Secular Political
Conception, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 1083, 1089 (1993) (discussing Rawls' hypothetical
"origial position").
THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 15, at 14-15. To arrive at the well-ordered
society, persons in the original position would have to choose principles requiring
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choose his own life style and have roughly equal access to mate-
rial goods to fund its pursuit.122
In Rawls' framework, the civil law can be criticized for in-
justice, but only insofar as constraints of fairness have been vio-
lated."= Moral objections in justice based on a full theory of the
good are held out of order.'24 For Rawls, it is axiomatic that
views on morality and religion are individual and may not be
imposed on others by law-since doing so would interfere with
the individual autonomy that parties behind the veil of ignorance
would hypothetically refuse to give up." Even more than
Lockean theory, Rawls' approach undercuts claims that rights
extend, under his ground rules, to unborn or even very small
children. 2 ' His model of personhood, after all, is the bargaining
adult intent on a share of material goods, and the autonomy to
pursue self-realization through the use of such goods.'27
Both Locke and Rawls respect religion and morality as an
individual's right, but in both cases religion and morality remain
otherwise fundamentally unrelated to the bases for legitimating
law and therefore also inadmissible as a basis for criticizing the
content of the civil law.
128
equality in the assignment of basic rights and duties. Id. Furthermore, these per-
sons would be justified in allowing inequalities of wealth and authority only if the
end attained results in benefits for all members of society. Id.; see also ROBERT
PAUL WOLFF, UNDERSTANDING RAWLS 38-41 (1977) (discussing Rawls' meaning of
equal liberty).
122 THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 15, at 302. Rawls also writes that "the distri-
bution of wealth and income, and the hierarchies of authority must be consistent
with both the liberties of equal citizenship and equality of opportunity." Id. at 61;
see also REX MARTIN, RAWLS AND RIGHTS 67-70 (1985) (explaining Rawls' view of
opportunities citizens should be entitled to pursue).
123 THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 15, at 54-60. Rawls writes that the
"impartial and consistent administration of laws ... we may call formal justice." Id.
at 58; see also Joshua Cohen, A More Democratic Liberalism, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1503,
1504 (1994) (discussing Rawls' proposed well-ordered society based on conception of
justice rooted in fair cooperation among free and equal people).
124 THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 15, at 59 ("[E]ven if laws ... are unjust, it is
often better that they should be consistently applied.").
121 Id. at 136-38.
"G See id. at 139. Rawls confines the class able to engage in the bargaining in
the original position. Id. Rawls writes that "the original position is not to be thought
of as a general assembly which includes at one moment everyone who will live at
some time; or, much less, as an assembly of everyone who could live at some time. It
is not a gathering of all actual or possible persons." Id. at 139.
117 THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 15, at 136-37; see also supra note 120 and
accompanying text.
128 See THOMAS W. POGGE, REALIZING RAWLS 96-97 (1989) (discussing Rawls'
views pertaining to religious and moral interests of individuals); see also THEORY OF
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Based on the review undertaken in this article of St. Tho-
mas' and St. Augustine's ideas, what can the Catholic response
be to this alternative contractarian scheme and its assertion of
the law's fundamental "secularity" or opaqueness to religious or
moral values? First, Catholicism, as the foregoing consideration
of St. Thomas and St. Augustine has shown, agrees that
"secularity" is a characteristic basic to the civil law. In fact, his-
torically, this insight is the product of the Christian tradition, of
which Rawlsian and Lockean theory, each in its own way, is an
offshoot. 129
The law exists to create the "world" of temporal peace (St.
Augustine) and of social virtue (St. Thomas). The civil law does
not exist to make the world into the Church, much less into a
particular view of heaven. For Christians also, "secularity,"
properly understood, is a fundamental measure of a good law.
Second, Catholicism will note that the bargaining model,
with its stress on the rights of those vying for material posses-
sions, is no more or less "religious," and on no more or less an
axiomatic grounding, than is the Catholic model of objective
moral equality and relationality as inherently constitutive of the
human good.
The Catholic does not respond to the objection based in
"secularity" by demanding that the door be opened to all unme-
diated religiously-based political arguments. He or she does not,
for example, expect that Sacred Revelation be acknowledged by
the makers of the civil law. What the Catholic requires is only
that his or her political axioms relating to human dignity be
given equal time with the Rawlsian axioms of individual auton-
omy. Using reason, Catholics believe they can demonstrate that
their axioms are the more suitable basis for constructing a just
society.
JUSTICE, supra note 15, at 310-15.
129 These viewpoints often occur in a tradition which preserves continuity even
with upheavals and reversals. Harold Berman, for example, posits "a civilization
called Western' " with "distinctive 'legal' institutions, values, and concepts" ...
"consciously transmitted from generation to generation over centuries, ... a
'tradition' periodically interrupted and transformed by revolutions." HAROLD J.
BERMAN, LAw AND REVOLUTION 1 (1983).
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B. The Objection that the "Private" Character of Procreative and
Other Activities Place Them Beyond the Regulative Scope of
the Civil Law
The Lockean-Rawlsian model is also helpful in understand-
ing the broader basis of the second objection that the "private"
character of procreative and other activities place them beyond
the regulative scope of the civil law. The Lockean approach
places a high value on privacy. 30 Property and religion give
shape, in Locke, to a domain beyond the usual regulative scope of
the majority will operating through the civil law.' In Rawls'
framework, this zone of privacy is also of prime importance, al-
though he both modifies and extends it.
132
In Rawls, property rights are restricted for the sake of dis-
tributional equality, which shifts the focus from protecting the
right to "keep more than others" to protecting the right to
"acquire as much as others."'33 But, the scope of personal auton-
omy to use property is placed, more than ever, beyond the cavil
of the majority.' The law's fundamental purpose, for Rawls, is
to secure fair portions of material means to all, without enforcing
values about how these means are to be used.'35 As a conse-
quence, even the common or public value of human procreation is
taken away. Procreation becomes an individual opportunity for
self-realization. If the state has any purpose in this area, it
would tend, in the Rawlsian model, to be the distribution of both
fertility and abortion facilities as fairly as possible, so that indi-
viduals could make of these "means" what they wished.'36 Pri-
vacy, in Rawls' system, is not just a limit to the law's action;
rather, as an expression of autonomy from the value choices of
others, privacy is arguably the law's highest value."7
"0 Second Treatise, supra note 15, at bk. II, ch. V.
131 Id.
12 THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 15, at 513-20 (discussing extent to which so-
ciety allows for personal autonomy).
13 Rawls' reliance on concepts of the original position and the veil of ignorance
effectively shifts the emphasis from the vested claims of the past to future-oriented
claims of opportunity.
134 POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 120, at 298. "The right to hold and have
the exclusive use of personal property" is a basic liberty which allows "a sufficient
material basis for a sense of personal independence and self respect." Id.
13 See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
'3' See THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 15, at 399-404.
137 See id. at 513-20 (characterizing autonomy as consistent with original posi-
tion).
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What is the Catholic response to the objection based in pri-
vacy? It should include the affirmation that "privacy" properly
understood, is and always has been a key value in Christian ju-
risprudence. As has been discerned in considering St. Augustine
and St. Thomas, the state does not inquire into private vice and
virtue in the Christian scheme of law. The inner sanctum of
personal identity and decision is an area in which a person by
nature is ultimately accountable to God and not to other people.
Witness the stringency of the seal of Confession in the Catholic
Church-in a way it is the very paradigm of privacy.'38 Modern
Church pronouncements have strongly supported the right of the
person to be free of intrusive governmental surveillance, the
right of parents to decide whether or not to conceive a child
without governmental interference, and the right to worship as
one chooses." 9
But, as has been revealed in St. Augustine and St. Thomas,
all such "privacy" related rights are to be understood as limita-
tions on state power which grow out of the objective dignity of
the human person. This is the same value that calls for respect-
ing claims in justice made on behalf of the unborn child.4 ° Thus,
privacy in the sense of individual autonomy does not, in the
Catholic view, have the status of a master value.14' In the
Catholic view, the objective dignity grounding privacy-related
rights also grounds the civil law's more fundamental orientation
to justice, understood as an order of reciprocity among human
persons as moral equals.' 4' Furthermore, in the Catholic view,
18 Traditionally, the seal of Confession has been recognized in civil law by two-
thirds of American jurisdictions as statutory priest-penitent privilege. 8 JOHN
HENRY WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2395, at 1042 (1961 and Supp. 1996).
139 See Gaudium et Spes 48-50 (Second Vatican Council 1965), Pacem in Terris
129 (John XXIII 1963), Dignitatis Humanae (1965), and Populorum Progressio 9
(Paul VI 1967), in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER (David
J. O'Brien and Thomas A. Shannon eds., 1992).
10 See The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response (U.S. Catholic
Bishops, 1983), in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER (David
J. O'Brien and Thomas A. Shannon eds., 1992) (citing Pope Paul VI's World Day of
Peace Message 1977; "[ijf you wish peace, defend life").
14 See Paul E. Sigmund, Catholicism and Liberal Democracy, in CATHOLIC
SOCIAL THOUGHT AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER 65, 67-68 (discussing Catholic
Church's reluctance to leave to individual choice decisions in areas considered to be
serious moral ills).
142 See Pacem in Terris (John XXIII 1963) in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT AND
THE NEW WORLD ORDER 129, 142-44 (noting relationship between citizens rights
and role of government).
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privacy rights are subject to limitation as justice requires.
CONCLUSION
By inquiring into contemporary objections to the Catholic
view of law and morality, based in the values of "secularity" and
"privacy," we have traced them to a general alternative in
thinking about law and morality, which makes privacy, or
autonomy of choice by adults in quest of self-realization the fun-
damental norm governing law. Our review of the thought of St.
Augustine and St. Thomas demonstrates that Catholic proposals
in this area rest, by contrast, on the objective moral dignity of all
human beings as the basic norm of justice and law. This Catho-
lic norm should be no less admissible in a "secular" public dis-
cussion than its alternative.
As a practical matter, Catholics can counter objections based
on "secularity" and "privacy" by offering their own interpreta-
tions of these popular values, interpretations that are well
grounded in a rich and distinctive tradition of thought on the
meaning and value of law.
' See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
19971
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
